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1 
Foreword: 
After Kiobel—International Human  
Rights Litigation in State Courts  
and Under State Law 
Christopher A. Whytock,* Donald Earl Childress III,**  
and Michael D. Ramsey*** 
Litigation in domestic courts is only one of many ways to promote and 
protect international human rights, but it has received much attention from 
lawyers, scholars, governments, and nongovernmental organizations.1 Attention 
has focused above all on litigation in the U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS),2 which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”3 Originally adopted by the U.S. 
Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,4 it was not until the Second Circuit’s 
 
* Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; Visiting Associate Professor of 
Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. 
*** Professor of Law and Director of International and Comparative Law Programs, University of 
San Diego School of Law. The authors thank Roger Alford, Patrick Borchers, Anthony Colangelo, 
Lee Crawford-Boyd, Michael Goldhaber, Paul Hoffman, David Kaye, Chimène Keitner, Julian Ku, 
Kristin Myles, Austen Parrish, Michael Robinson-Dorn, Beth Stephens, Edward Swaine, and Symeon 
Symeonides for their valuable contributions to the symposium on Human Rights Litigation in State 
Courts and Under State Law, and the members of the UC Irvine Law Review, especially John Bridge, 
for their excellent work on this issue. 
1. See generally RALPH G. STEINHARDT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAWYERING: CASES AND MATERIALS (2009) (providing an overview of human rights advocacy not 
only in domestic courts, but also in other domestic institutions, as well as through intergovernmental 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the media). See also Owen C. Pell et al., The Alien 
Tort Statute at a Crossroads: The High Court Revisits Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum in a Rare Reargument, WHITE & CASE ALERTS (Sept. 2012), http://www.whitecase.com/ 
alerts-09272012; Erica Razook, Corporate Accountability Comes Before the U.S. Supreme Court, AMNESTY 
INT’L HUM. RTS. NOW BLOG (Mar. 2, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/justice/corporate- 
accountability-comes-before-the-u-s-supreme-court. 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
3. Id. 
4. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (noting that “[t]he first Congress 
passed [the ATS] as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789”). 
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landmark decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala in 1980 that the ATS became a basis for 
litigating human rights claims in the U.S. federal courts.5 According to one recent 
estimate, well over 100 human rights suits have been filed under the ATS since 
that decision.6 
However, plaintiffs face growing barriers to ATS human rights litigation in 
the U.S. federal courts.7 Some of these barriers are substantive. In its 2004 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,8 the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the range of 
international law violations for which the ATS could provide subject matter 
jurisdiction, holding that “federal courts should not recognize private claims under 
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite 
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when [the ATS] was enacted,”9 namely, “violation of safe conducts, 
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”10 In addition, the Court 
observed, “the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a 
cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of 
judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause available to 
litigants in the federal courts.”11 After Sosa, some courts of appeal have dismissed 
prominent ATS claims for failure to show violations of specific and widely 
accepted rules of international law, including with respect to secondary liability.12 
Other barriers are procedural. For instance, some circuits have applied the 
forum non conveniens doctrine in ATS cases, including the Second Circuit in 
Türedi v. Coca-Cola Co., a case involving Turkish citizens injured and imprisoned 
allegedly in violation of international law due to a labor dispute,13 and the 
Eleventh Circuit in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., a case concerning a 
lawsuit by Guatemalan labor unionists against the owner of a Guatemalan banana 
plantation claiming that the defendant participated in torture and other human 
 
5. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980); see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS, at xxii (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the 
Filártiga case was “the first successful use of the [ATS] to enable victims of international human rights 
violations to sue in U.S. courts”). 
6. Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed 
System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357 (2011) (noting that since 1980, “U.S. courts 
have issued 173 opinions in cases brought, at least in part, under the ATS”). 
7. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 728–32 (2012) (describing a contraction of ATS litigation 
by the U.S. federal courts). 
8. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. 
9. Id. at 732. 
10. Id. at 724. 
11. Id. at 732–33. 
12. See, e.g., Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 398 (4th Cir. 2011) (adopting the mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions from Talisman Energy); Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that “the mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone”). 
13. Türedi v. Coca-Cola Co., 343 F. App’x 623, 626 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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rights violations.14 Some circuits are also requiring heightened pleading standards 
in ATS cases. In Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., a case involving allegations of 
corporate collaboration with Colombian paramilitary forces to murder and torture 
trade union leaders and employees, the Eleventh Circuit relied on heightened 
plausibility pleading standards enunciated recently by the Supreme Court in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal15 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly16 to require ATS plaintiffs to 
plead a claim that is plausible on its face by showing that a defendant violated a 
specific international law norm.17 Some courts have also suggested that plaintiffs 
must exhaust local remedies before proceeding with their claims in the U.S. federal 
courts.18 Accordingly, plaintiffs will not only face significant hurdles in pleading 
their claims but may also lose access to the tools of discovery for obtaining 
evidence of wrongdoing. Moreover, when matters of foreign policy are 
implicated—as is often said to be the case in ATS cases—the court may dismiss a 
suit on the basis of the political question doctrine, the act of state doctrine, or 
international comity.19 
In addition, because the doctrines of foreign state immunity, head of state 
immunity, and foreign official immunity limit the range of defendants against 
whom plaintiffs may bring ATS suits,20 plaintiffs often sue corporate defendants 
instead.21 However, the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., an 
ATS lawsuit by Nigerian plaintiffs against an oil company for allegedly aiding and 
abetting human rights violations by the Nigerian government, held that 
corporations are not subject to suit under the ATS because corporate liability has 
 
14. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1286, 1300 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
15. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
16. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
17. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266–69 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated by 
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). Courts in other circuits have employed 
heightened pleading standards to dismiss ATS claims for lack of plausibility. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle, 
S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1098, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
18. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(suggesting that “a U.S. court might, as a matter of international comity, stay an Alien Tort suit that 
had been filed in the U.S. court, in order to give the courts of the nation in which the violation had 
occurred a chance to remedy it, provided that the nation seemed willing and able to do that”). 
19. See generally Brief for Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae on 
Reargument Supporting Petitioners at 10–19, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 
(U.S. argued Oct. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 2165339, at *11–19 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Brief] 
(providing an overview of these doctrines). 
20. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 5, at 365–84 (providing an overview of immunities 
defenses to ATS suits). 
21. Estimates of the number of ATS suits filed against corporations vary. Compare Beth 
Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
773, 814 (2008) (estimating that there have been approximately eighty-five ATS suits filed against 
corporations from 1960 through the article’s publication), with Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. 
Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 456, 460 (2011) (estimating that there have been approximately 155 such suits). 
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not been established specifically as part of international law.22 Because other 
circuits reached a different conclusion,23 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review 
the Kiobel case and heard arguments in 2012. 
Although the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in Kiobel to decide the 
issue of corporate civil tort liability under the ATS, it subsequently ordered 
reargument on the broader question of “[w]hether and under what circumstances 
the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”24 In addition, comments by the justices in the Kiobel oral arguments raise 
the possibility that the Court may require exhaustion of local remedies in ATS 
litigation.25 At the time this issue of the UC Irvine Law Review went to press, the 
Supreme Court had yet to announce its decision in Kiobel. However, it is likely that 
the Court will limit ATS litigation—perhaps substantially.26 
All of this raises an important question: What will human rights litigation 
look like after Kiobel? Put differently, “[i]f the federal courthouse doors that were 
opened by the Second Circuit’s Filártiga decision are now being closed, what other 
windows remain open for human-rights activists and plaintiffs?”27 The Kiobel 
decision is unlikely to end ATS litigation in the federal courts,28 but it is likely that 
many post-Kiobel human rights claimants will consider alternative strategies. 
However, alternative approaches in federal courts appear to be quite limited. 
Relatively few federal statutes provide express private causes of action for 
international human rights violations. The most prominent of these, the Torture 
Victim Protection Act,29 applies only to torture and extrajudicial killing, and the 
Supreme Court recently limited it (in accordance with its text) to individual 
 
22. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g denied, 
642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 642 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 
(2011) (No. 10-1491), argued Feb. 28, 2012, and restored to calendar for reargument, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) 
(No. 10-1491). 
23. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 
1025; Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
24. Order in Pending Case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 
2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/030512zr.pdf. 
25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-
1491 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument 
_transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf (exchanges between counsel for petitioners and Justices Ginsburg and 
Kagan regarding the amicus brief of the European Commission, which proposed an exhaustion 
requirement). 
26. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: In Search of an ATS Compromise, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 1, 
2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/argument-recap-3 (arguing that “[a] compromise 
seem[s] in the offing” in Kiobel between justices wishing to limit the ATS’s reach and a majority that 
“did not seem inclined to narrow the [ATS] nearly into non-existence”).  
27. Childress, supra note 7, at 739. 
28. See Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in 
State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 10 (2013) (arguing that “even under the most restrictive 
outcome of the Kiobel decision, human rights cases will continue in both federal and state courts”). 
29. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
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defendants, rather than corporations and other entities.30 The Court generally has 
been reluctant to find an implied right of action where none is expressed,31 and 
indeed some federal legislation in the area, such as the Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act,32 specifically forecloses private claims. Further, the Court has 
sharply limited the extraterritorial effect of generally worded federal statutes 
through a strict presumption against extraterritoriality, making them difficult to 
apply to human rights violations abroad.33 Finally, federal courts have been 
reluctant to find common law rights of action for international law violations 
under jurisdictional statutes other than the ATS, such as the statute providing for 
federal question jurisdiction.34 As a result, international human rights litigation 
under U.S. federal law apart from the ATS may be viable only in a few specific 
areas.35 
Another alternative is human rights litigation in state courts or under state 
law. This is not a new strategy.36 Indeed, if substantive and procedural barriers to 
human rights litigation under U.S. federal law in the U.S. federal courts continue 
to grow, plaintiffs alleging human rights violations are increasingly likely to 
consider pursuing their claims in state courts or under state law. This may be part 
of the next wave of transnational litigation.37 
Among the potential attractions of state courts and state law, human rights 
claimants might be able to avoid application of the federal forum non conveniens 
doctrine and strict federal pleading standards, and in some cases they may find a 
more sympathetic judge or jury.38 Since “[t]he same conduct that constitutes a 
 
30. Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012). 
31. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091–1092 (2006). 
33. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010). 
34. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(holding that international law claims are not cognizable under the commercial activity exception to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that international law claims are not cognizable under the statute granting federal question 
jurisdiction). 
35. For example, in addition to the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. II 2008), provides an express cause of action for 
some acts of terrorism, and, arguably, the FSIA’s expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) 
(2006), supports international law causes of action for expropriation. For an assessment of non-ATS 
options for human rights litigation in the federal courts, see STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 5, at 75–
128. 
36. See generally Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights in State Courts: 
A View from California, 18 INT’L L. 61 (1984) (discussing human rights litigation in state courts); 
Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 28, at 13 (“Long before the Second Circuit decided the Filártiga case, 
human rights advocates looked to state courts to enforce international human rights norms.”). 
37. Childress, supra note 7, at 757. 
38. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 5, at 121 (noting that “[t]o date, state litigation has 
generally been a course of last resort,” but that “litigation in state court may be a reasonable option in 
some cases, if litigants and their lawyers are more familiar with state procedure or predict a more 
sympathetic judge or jury in the state system”). 
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violation of international human rights norms usually also violates the law of the 
place where it occurred and the law of the forum state,”39 plaintiffs might be able 
to avoid Sosa’s limitations on the types of international law violations over which 
the ATS provides jurisdiction by pleading their claims under state or foreign law.40 
Moreover, by pleading human rights claims as domestic tort claims rather than 
violations of international law—for example, assault and battery or intentional 
infliction of emotional harm rather than torture, or wrongful death instead of 
extrajudicial execution—plaintiffs might be able to avoid limits on corporate 
liability for international law violations such as those imposed by the Second 
Circuit (and perhaps eventually by the Supreme Court) in Kiobel.41 
But even if state courts and state law hold promise, they will not be a simple 
panacea for human rights claimants.42 Some limits, such as personal jurisdiction,43 
foreign sovereign immunity, and the act of state doctrine, apply equally in state 
court.44 Further, defendants sued in state court for human rights violations may be 
able to remove the case to federal court and thus invoke the protections of federal 
procedural law.45 Even in suits that are not removed, states have their own 
versions of the forum non conveniens doctrine,46 and it remains to be seen 
whether state courts will use the doctrine more or less aggressively than federal 
 
39. See id. at 120. 
40. See Childress, supra note 7, at 740 (discussing this possibility). 
41. See Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45, 48–49 (2013) (discussing this potential advantage); Hoffman & Stephens, 
supra note 28, at 18 (same). 
42. See generally Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigation: A Concerning 
Trend?, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 25 (2013) (discussing potential drawbacks of litigation in state courts 
and under state law for the advancement of human rights goals). 
43. Notably, the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011), limits the scope of general personal jurisdiction, potentially making it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish personal jurisdiction in human rights cases, especially over 
non-U.S. defendants in suits alleging human rights violations that occurred outside U.S. territory. 
See id. at 2851 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) 
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”); id. at 2853–54 
(“[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s 
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as 
at home,” such as its place of incorporation or principal place of business). 
44. As a constitutional rule derived from the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdiction 
requirements govern all courts in the United States. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governs 
the immunity of foreign states in both U.S. state courts and federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 
(2006). In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held that the common law act of 
state doctrine, although not constitutionally required, applied equally in state and federal courts, and 
the same would seem to be true of non-statutory immunity doctrines. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964). 
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (setting forth the statutory framework for removal of actions 
from state to federal court). 
46. See Borchers, supra note 41, at 59 (discussing application of forum non conveniens 
doctrine in state human rights litigation); Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens 
Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 315–16 (2002) (discussing state forum non conveniens doctrines). 
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courts to dismiss human rights suits. There are also difficult issues surrounding 
the application of international law in state courts.47 Moreover, state choice-of-law 
principles might point toward the application of foreign rather than state law, and 
although the U.S. Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify the limits on 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. federal statutes,48 the limits on the 
extraterritorial application of state statutes and state common law are unsettled.49 
Federal foreign affairs preemption and other constitutional limits on state 
involvement in international matters are yet further potential barriers to human 
rights litigation under state law.50 Many of these issues remain incompletely 
explored because the focus of litigation in this area has been on federal courts’ 
application of federal law, and in particular on the ATS—a focus that may now be 
shifting. We are, in short, only beginning to encounter and assess the diverse and 
difficult issues raised by international human rights litigation in state courts and 
under state law. 
When assessing these issues, there are good reasons to take a comparative 
perspective. There are potentially valuable insights to be gained from an 
understanding of similar legal strategies in other contexts,51 as well as from 
strategies in jurisdictions outside the United States.52 Moreover, an overly U.S.-
centric perspective risks missing the relationship between litigation trends inside 
and outside the United States and the possibility that the less open the United 
States becomes to human rights litigation, the more courts in other countries will 
 
47. For discussions of some of these issues, see Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 28, at 20–22, 
and David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 95 (2013). 
48. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (holding that section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs 
suing foreign and U.S. defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign 
exchanges). 
49. For explorations of these and related issues of choice of law and extraterritoriality, see 
Borchers, supra note 41, at 49–52 (discussing choice-of-law issues related to both substantive tort law 
and damages); Anthony J. Colangelo & Kristina A. Kiik, Spatial Legality, Due Process, and Choice of Law in 
Human Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 63 (2013) (using concept of spatial legality to elucidate choice-
of-law and extraterritoriality issues); Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 28, at pt. IV (discussing choice-
of-law issues in state court human rights litigation); and Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory 
Torts in Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81 (2013) (discussing transitory torts). 
50. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003) (finding foreign affairs 
preemption of state law). For discussion of the preemption issues potentially raised by human rights 
litigation in state courts and under state law, see Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 28, at 20; Kaye, 
supra note 47, at 122–24. 
51. See Parrish, supra note 42, at 35–39 (drawing insights about human rights litigation in state 
courts from similar strategies in environmental litigation and the state constitutionalism movement). 
52. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: 
A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127 (2013) (analyzing human rights litigation in non-
U.S. jurisdictions). 
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become forums for human rights litigation.53 We may be on the verge of a new 
world of transnational human rights litigation where U.S. state courts and courts 
outside the United States will increasingly overshadow U.S. federal courts as 
forums for the adjudication of human rights claims. 
On March 2, 2012, some of the nation’s leading practitioners and scholars of 
human rights, international law, and conflict of laws came together at the UC 
Irvine School of Law for the symposium, Human Rights Litigation in State Courts 
and Under State Law, where they discussed these and other important and 
difficult questions raised by this alternative method of human rights promotion 
and protection—questions that heretofore have received little attention compared 
to those raised by human rights litigation in federal courts under the ATS. The 
contributions to this issue of the UC Irvine Law Review, written by participants in 
the symposium, provide a valuable resource for those who will be grappling with 
these questions in the years to come. 
 
 
53. See id. (discussing human rights litigation in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Australia, and Canada); see also Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity 
in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 32–35 
(2011) (presenting evidence suggesting that at the same time U.S. courts are decreasingly open to 
transnational litigation, other countries’ courts are increasingly attracting it). 
